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The History of Bitcoin Mixers

Bitcoin is often perceived as an anonymous currency. However, its transactions are pseudonymous by default. Every transfer is recorded on a public blockchain, and connections between addresses can be analyzed using specialized tools. If an address can be linked to a person through an exchange, a merchant, or a KYC procedure, part of that person’s transaction history may become available for analysis.

Bitcoin mixers emerged in an attempt to address this problem. They are services and protocols designed to make it more difficult to associate original coins with subsequent payments. Over more than fifteen years, they have evolved from simple centralized exchanges with a high risk of fraud into sophisticated cryptographic protocols that can operate without transferring custody of the coins to an operator.

At the same time, mixers have always existed at the intersection of two competing interests: the right to financial privacy and the fight against money laundering. Some users employed them to protect commercial or personal information, while others used them to conceal criminal proceeds. This contradiction largely determined the subsequent fate of most well-known projects.

What Is a Bitcoin Mixer?
A classic centralized mixer operates according to a simple model. A user sends bitcoin to the service, after which the service sends coins from another address-usually from a shared pool of funds. Ideally, the user receives coins different from those originally deposited, including coins that previously belonged to other customers.

In simplified form, the process works as follows:

  • The user sends funds to the mixer.
  • The service combines them with deposits from other customers.
  • The funds are moved between several internal addresses.
  • The user specifies a new withdrawal address.
  • The service sends bitcoin from the shared pool, retaining a fee.

This removes the direct on-chain connection between a specific incoming transfer and a specific outgoing transfer. However, complete anonymity is not guaranteed. Analysis of transaction timing, amounts, fees, recurring addresses, and user behavior may allow some connections to be reconstructed.

The First Mixers: 2010–2012

Discussion of bitcoin mixing began almost simultaneously with the formation of the early cryptocurrency community. Around 2010, Bitcointalk and other forums were already discussing the public nature of the blockchain and the need to break the connection between addresses.

Bitcoin Laundry, also known as BitLaundry, is generally considered the first widely known service. Its model was relatively primitive: users sent bitcoin to the service and later received other coins from its shared reserve.

In 2011, Blindbitcoin emerged as one of the first projects to use blind signatures. This technology is associated with the ideas of David Chaum and allows a message to be signed without revealing its contents to the signer. In the context of a mixer, a blind signature could confirm a user’s right to receive funds without allowing the operator to directly link the deposit to the withdrawal address.

In 2012, variable fees were discussed, and several mixers were hacked. One of the affected services even created a claims page for recovering funds and required users to undergo identity verification. By modern standards, this was paradoxical: a service created to enhance privacy linked the recovery of funds to the disclosure of a user’s identity.

The early market was extremely unreliable. Alongside functioning services, there were outright scams. Operators frequently advertised mixers on forums, while Bitcointalk moderators regularly warned users about possible fraud. Services hosted on the Tor network did not guarantee honest behavior either: a hidden address could protect not only users but also the operators of fraudulent schemes.

Some early operators stored their reserves on cryptocurrency exchanges, including Mt. Gox. At the time, this was technically possible because cryptocurrency regulation was still in its early stages. The subsequent strengthening of AML requirements and transaction monitoring made this model much less viable.

From Centralized Services to Cryptographic Protocols

A centralized mixer solves one problem - hiding the direct link between an input and an output - but creates another: the user must trust an intermediary.

For this reason, researchers began developing protocols in which the operator could not steal funds or determine the correspondence between participants. These proposals included Mixcoin, Blindcoin, CoinShuffle, CoinParty, Xim, Obscuro, and TumbleBit.
Mixcoin

Mixcoin proposed the use of signed guarantees. The service issued users a cryptographically signed commitment confirming the terms of the transaction. If the operator violated the agreement, the user could publicly present the evidence.

This improved the mixer’s accountability but did not solve every problem. The operator could still steal funds or independently determine the correspondence between incoming and outgoing addresses.

Blindcoin
Blindcoin developed the Mixcoin concept by using blind tokens and a public log. The user provided the mixer with a hidden token containing an output address and a random value. The operator could verify the user’s entitlement to a payout without seeing the token’s original contents.

This reduced the risk of revealing the correspondence between inputs and outputs, but it did not eliminate the possibility of the operator stealing funds.

CoinShuffle and CoinParty
CoinShuffle was proposed in 2014 as a decentralized protocol that did not require a trusted intermediary. Participants created a joint transaction themselves, while output addresses were shuffled before the transaction was published.

CoinParty used a different approach: interaction through temporary escrow addresses and secure multiparty computation. Its purpose was to prevent theft even if some participants behaved maliciously.

In practice, decentralized protocols faced a common problem: they needed to find a sufficient number of participants at the same time. The smaller the group, the weaker the anonymity. The larger the group, the longer participants might have to wait.

The Emergence of CoinJoin
A major turning point was the CoinJoin concept, formulated by Gregory Maxwell in 2013. Its basic idea is to combine the operations of several users into a single Bitcoin transaction.

Suppose five people each want to move 0.1 BTC. Instead of creating five separate transactions, they create one transaction containing:

  • five inputs of approximately 0.1 BTC each;
  • five identical outputs of 0.1 BTC each;
  • a signature from each participant covering only their own part of the transaction.

An observer can see all the inputs and outputs but cannot determine with certainty which input corresponds to which output. The more participants there are, and the more uniform the outputs are, the larger the set of possible correspondences-known as the anonymity set.

CoinJoin does not require any changes to the underlying Bitcoin protocol. It uses ordinary transactions and standard signing rules but changes the way transactions are constructed.

However, CoinJoin does not turn bitcoin into completely untraceable money. The transaction itself often has a recognizable structure, and a user’s subsequent actions may reconnect the coins with their previous history.

Custodial Mixing

This is the classic model in which the service takes control of the user’s coins and later pays out different coins. It is simpler for the user, but it requires greater trust in the service and in the conditions offered by the mixer.

Coordinated CoinJoin

In this model, a separate coordinator brings participants together, constructs the joint transaction, and helps exchange the necessary data. The funds should not be transferred to the coordinator: each user signs the transaction directly from their own wallet.

Cryptographic credentials and blind signatures may prevent the coordinator from linking inputs to outputs. However, the coordinator remains an infrastructure point that can be shut down, restricted, or subjected to legal pressure.

Decentralized CoinJoin
In a decentralized model, participants find one another through a distributed marketplace or network. JoinMarket has historically served as an example of this type of architecture.

The advantage is the absence of a single operator that can be shut down or compelled to maintain a centralized user database. The disadvantages include more complex setup, the need to maintain liquidity, and longer waiting times. At the same time, many AML systems are already capable of recognizing this type of mixing model.

How Our Mixer Works

After weighing the advantages and disadvantages of different systems, we selected a reliable mixing method based on custodial mixing while providing users with coins sourced from exchanges. This approach addresses several user concerns at once:

  • A convenient and simple method for replacing coins with an unfavorable transaction history.
  • No need to wait until a sufficient number of participants has joined the mixing process.
  • Guaranteed delivery of coins without a direct on-chain link to the sender’s address.

As part of our trust model, we provide a letter of guarantee for every transaction and work promptly with customers throughout the process if any questions arise.

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the history part is decent, though the bit about early operators keeping reserves on mt. gox is the detail that always sticks with me. one thing I'd push back on: "coins from exchanges" isn't the same as clean coins, plenty of exchange withdrawals carry their own taint. how do you handle that in practice?
Ответы · 1
@MoonlitCache,

As a rule, coins sourced from major, reputable exchanges have a more readily verifiable source of funds and are generally considered lower-risk from an AML perspective. They also let us provide coins with a relatively short transaction history—roughly one hop from the exchange.

you have some really interesting write ups, always look forward to reading them. please keep them coming

Ответы · 1
Ответы · 1
hmm, custodial model with a letter of guarantee still means trusting the operator not to log the input-output pair, and that's exactly the thing a signed promise can't prove. the history part is solid though - funnily, the "modern" pooled custodial approach is basically BitLaundry with better branding.
Ответы · 1
@SpareParachute,

Yes, trust in the service is essential in a custodial model.

For example, that’s why, in addition to providing a letter of guarantee, we let users make a small test transaction of 0.001 BTC to assess the quality of our service.

We’re also open to questions and feedback about how our service operates, and we welcome feedback from our customers. That’s why we’re happy to be listed in various directories.