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China's AI Race Is Moving Beyond the ChipВажное на главной

The race to build artificial intelligence is also a race to assemble the electricity, networks, buildings and software that keep thousands of processors working together. Ulanqab, in Inner Mongolia, illustrates China's attempt to put those pieces in one place — and the gap between an ambitious plan and working computing capacity.

A report by Taiwan's Cnyes describes a surge of data-centre projects in Ulanqab and says companies are drawn by access to power and proximity to Beijing. Local officials likewise describe the city as part of China's east-to-west computing strategy. A Shanghai state-owned enterprise regulator says one Ulanqab cloud-computing project has achieved network latency to central Beijing as low as four milliseconds. That is a project-specific claim, not a guarantee for every customer or workload.

Huawei's roadmap

Huawei's own September 17, 2026 announcement puts its Ascend 970 on a 2028 roadmap, not in production in September 2026. The company says the Ascend 960DT is expected in the first quarter of 2027. These are vendor plans, subject to execution. Building a competitive platform also requires memory, interconnects, developer tools and software that can run models efficiently across large clusters.

Raw petaflop claims do not settle the competition. NVIDIA lists 1,080 dense FP4 petaflops for its GB300 NVL72 system, a rack-scale configuration with 72 GPUs; its larger advertised figure uses sparsity. Comparing a reported number for an Ascend chip with a different NVIDIA system without matching precision, sparsity and hardware scope would be misleading. Real workloads add further questions about memory, networking, power and software efficiency.

Cnyes reports a proposed DeepSeek data centre and plans for at least 160,000 Ascend 950DT chips. Bloomberg separately reported that the planned order would primarily support inference. Treat that as a reported plan, not a verified installed cluster. Publicly available primary evidence reviewed for this article does not establish the eventual chip count, delivery schedule or whether DeepSeek co-designed a future Ascend chip. Training a model and serving its answers also impose different demands on a cluster; neither headline chip counts nor peak arithmetic alone show the cost of a useful response.

The power question

Ulanqab's appeal is more than land for server halls. Local authorities describe efforts to connect wind and solar generation with computing demand, while a project financier cites cooling and power advantages. Cnyes attributes a 12.5-gigawatt figure to Goldman Sachs as data-centre capacity commitments, and reports a much smaller operating footprint in 2025. A commitment is not a completed facility, an actual load or electricity generated. These figures should not be added together or treated as verified present-day consumption.

Wind and solar capacity is measured in gigawatts; electricity delivered over time is measured in gigawatt-hours. A region's installed capacity cannot be assumed to provide its full rated output around the clock. The International Energy Agency notes that grids, storage, dispatchable supply and flexible demand all matter when incorporating variable generation. For an AI operator, the relevant bill includes transmission, backup, cooling and financing as well as the price of generation.

Comparisons of the upfront cost per kilowatt of nuclear and renewable plants are therefore not comparisons of the final cost of reliable power delivered to an AI cluster. Site conditions, construction time, utilisation and the cost of balancing the system can change the result. Water use and the availability of advanced chips are additional constraints identified in the Cnyes report.

What matters next

China's approach is to build an ecosystem: domestic accelerators, large computing campuses, power procurement and fast connections to customers. It could reduce dependence on imported computing capacity and make large-scale inference more accessible. But announced projects are not completed infrastructure, and a domestic chip roadmap is not a measured performance lead.

The meaningful tests will be how much capacity is actually delivered and used, whether software makes the hardware productive, and what reliable computing costs over time. The contest is not just over who announces the biggest cluster; it is over who can turn power and silicon into dependable, affordable services.

Sources: Bloomberg; Cnyes; Huawei; NVIDIA; Shanghai state-owned enterprise regulator; International Energy Agency.

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The four-millisecond claim is the more interesting number for anyone selling capacity, since inference buyers care about round trip to their users, not peak flops on a spec sheet. Of course that's one project, one route, and probably a favourable benchmark day. Also worth noting the utilities bill, not the silicon, is what usually kills a campus plan.
The 12.5 GW figure versus the actual 2025 footprint is the part worth watching. Commitments announced in press cycles have a habit of arriving years late and smaller, and the grid and cooling costs are what really decide whether the inference is affordable. Ascend roadmap versus delivered silicon is the other half of the story.