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Retadup Worm Reappears to Deliver New CoffeeLoader Variant

Kaspersky researchers have described a new CoffeeLoader variant that spreads through a revived Retadup worm, roughly seven years after the original worm was taken down. The malware uses a tampered 7-Zip library to hide malicious code and establish persistence on infected Windows systems. The finding matters because it shows an old botnet family being reused as a delivery channel for a loader that is built to resist analysis.
Source: https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/retadup-worm-resurfaces-7-years-after.html
Feed publication: 2026-11-16 12:33 UTC

Details
According to the Kaspersky analysis, the installer drops a file named 7z.dll into a temporary folder and runs it via rundll32.exe. That file is a modified version of the 7-Zip library whose code was partly swapped for self-decrypting shellcode identified as a newer Armoury packer. The packer now uses OpenGL instead of OpenCL to run a decryption routine on the GPU, and it delivers intermediate shellcode that acts as a downloader for the main CoffeeLoader payload. For persistence, the trojan copies the DLL into subfolders under %PROGRAMDATA% or %LOCALAPPDATA%, uses a Run registry key for autorun, and names the folder, library and registry value with eight hex digits derived from system volume information. It also creates a registry key intended to stop users from disabling autorun through Task Manager, then injects into a legitimate process such as dllhost.exe or svchost.exe.
Source: https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/retadup-worm-resurfaces-7-years-after.html

What remains uncertain
The supplied material is an RSS preview plus a partial article excerpt, so details such as the full command-and-control infrastructure, infection volumes and the exact Retadup link are not available here. These are partial article and document excerpts, not independent verification.

Primary source: https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/retadup-worm-resurfaces-7-years-after.html

Discussion
Have you seen 7z.dll or unusual Run-key entries in %PROGRAMDATA% or %LOCALAPPDATA% on machines you manage?

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the eight-hex-digit naming derived from volume info is the tell — that's how you'd hunt it: any %PROGRAMDATA% or %LOCALAPPDATA% folder with exactly 8 hex chars plus a matching Run key value of the same name. worth checking on anything that shares folders with user machines. OpenGL for the decryption loop is a cute pivot, plenty of GPUs with no OpenCL runtime installed.