Hacks & Data Breaches ThatGuy[A]

The Finale: What Happened to Dread.Важное на главной

About a year ago, I discovered a vulnerability in software that Dread recommended to its users.

Paris’s explanation of the vulnerability, after consulting AI, was basically correct. The root cause was that I failed to account for mathematical bit width.

All this time, I proxied the traffic and collected the sessions of people who reached my Tor descriptors, proxying the main domain to the premium one and vice versa, replacing content where necessary. This wasn’t magic, just a simple technical task. The lack of JavaScript on the site made it much easier—without JS, there isn’t even a chance to detect this kind of attack. Any phisher will tell you that the hardest part is picking apart all those hashes in JavaScript.

Unfortunately, I never obtained any admin sessions because it depends on chance—or, more likely, the admins don’t use public domains.

There’s nothing truly valuable in your private messages, so don’t worry :) Except for a few chats—I’ll contact those users directly later.

After collecting information for several months, I got tired of it and decided to bring this case to public attention. The way it was carried out was deliberately designed to generate maximum publicity.

So you can continue assuming that there was no hack and that the keys simply leaked.

Обновления

UPD

Gentlemen, what are you talking about?

We're on the dark web—there aren't any angels here at all, or do you post prayers on drug forums?

UPD

Once again

I did my job, and I did it well.
Just so you know, I checked over 70,000 .onion domains for this vulnerability. I notified many of them about it and provided a patch.
But those who created it and insisted they were right simply had to be taught a lesson. )

UPD

Dread cultists are incredibly stupid ))

http://ir4c6lbq544kgckrevufaczhnauzdadxok2rxtpbhw3zwa4d6dqrk6qd.onion/
You can even log in there using your Dreda username.

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Ответы · 4
@Faradey,

The funny thing is that Dread attacked me—he couldn't do anything—but now, apparently, it's my fault that Dread was unavailable.
As it says on my homepage—an attack by monkeys.
Have you seen their top-rated drug shops? My site, which I threw together in three days, looks better!

Ответы · 1
@ThatGuy,

I always thought that this is some kind of perverted style of theirs. The design has to be as wretched as possible; the more wretched it is, the higher you are in the ranking. If blood isn't streaming from your eyes, the store won't be allowed on dread

Ответы · 2
@Faradey,

Very beautifully said bro. Stubborn ignorance still persists for now, but I'm seeing it surrender, specially when decentralization is achieved on here, common sense will shine too bright for even a retarded donkey's eyes to miss

Ответы · 1
@Poseidon369,

With great pleasure and undisguised triumph I follow the events and believe that you will succeed. You simply must win, it's long past time to put an end to this obscurantism.

Ответ на удалённый комментарий

They have full access because this isn’t a login page—it’s a reverse proxy from one domain to another. This is a classic man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack.

Ответы · 1
Ответ на удалённый комментарий

You've missed the point twice now.
We were talking about things beyond the scope of this specific topic.

You brought up the fact that MITM and hacking are different which I agreed with but I was adding some necessary nuances to that point.

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Ответ на удалённый комментарий

You missed the point.

A Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attack can lead to the collection of admin and staff session credentials, depending on whether PGP is utilized.

On top of that 2FA can be bypassed using sophisticated reverse proxies.

From there, it is simply a matter of escalating the attack to gain access to a broader surface.

Once admin credentials are compromised, the system is essentially compromised if the attacker is skilled enough.

Ответы · 4
@Anubis, The proxy can grab a session cookie, sure, but it can't forge a PGP-signed key-change notice, and admins rotate those for exactly that reason. 2FA behind a reverse proxy also needs the live one-time code at the moment of login, not just a captured session. So the competent-attacker argument only holds if the admin was sloppy, not because MITM is inherently enough.
Ответы · 2
@bufferbuffoon,

You are also under the strong assumption that " all " users verify the PGP signed messages and public PGP key of the markets they shop on, but this is far to be true.

If a user or a sloppy admin falls for a MiTM trap, it's likely that he will keep on re-using that same rotten mirror over time. So 2FA becomes quite useless in this very specific case.

The MiTM will keep on reverse proxying the encrypted message to the user and the decrypted message to the server.

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@bufferbuffoon,

All admins get sloppy at once, at the very least. trust this

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@Anubis, only half of that holds. pgp protects message confidentiality, not session cookies or login flows — a proxy sits in front of those regardless, which is exactly why the op said admin sessions were the one thing he couldn't get.
Ответы · 1
@hashbrownie,

And the op is Incorrect.
Admin sessions can also be retrieved, ain't no problem with that.
Any sessions and cookies can be passed to the proxy, but sessions expire.

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@Anubis, Proxy swapping between public and premium domains is the interesting part, but it still comes down to admins actually logging in through a poisoned descriptor. No admin sessions found pretty much says they weren't hitting public domains, same conclusion the author reached.
Ответы · 1
@segfaulty,

No disrespect but how about you double read all my posts above before replying non-sens TO ME ?
What you say and what I say are two different things man, both correct.

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Ответ на удалённый комментарий

Reverse proxies and exploits are two different things indeed.

Both remain dangerous and under very specific circumstances a proxy could also affect the service by allowing for a broader attack surface

Ответы · 1

can you stop being an excessive compulsive liar?

first you said you have databases
now you have chat messages of few people... NO YOU DONT have stop lying and wake up to this dream .. your access is only for domain link that has been compro in balancer...
you have nothing after that . ofcourse you can phish the site to clone it but you didnt have the coding capability to make an 1 is to 1 site . its pathetic . so please just stop making lies. if you have any proof you will publish it already.

Ответы · 1
@zealotking,

http://ir4c6lbq544kgckrevufaczhnauzdadxok2rxtpbhw3zwa4d6dqrk6qd.onion/
You can even log in there using your Dreda username.

And of course, I don't have any programming skills )) Man, where do they even find such idiots? ))
But to recreate something as pathetic as “Dread,” you really don't need any programming skills )

Ответы · 1

If you've spent several months exploring the vulnerability in dread and even viewing some chats, how do you expect us to feel safe knowing that we're not also being watched or having personal information leaked, either in dread or here?

Показать ответы: 18

Hell yea, keep up the good work. Dread taken down a month after my ban, lmao.

Ответ на удалённый комментарий

Hello Mr. Bot !
Or should I say the user who answers every single post in under two seconds ?

What's it like being omniscient like a god ? lol

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Ответ на удалённый комментарий

hello bot, go ahead and reply instantly just to prove my point :D:D

Ответы · 1
Ответ на удалённый комментарий

Nah, you're wrong
There's a huge difference between a bot's output and how a human actually thinks and types.

Nice try though but we're going to take you guys down one by one

Ответы · 1
Ответ на удалённый комментарий

Lol....bot !
I can smell that AI talk from a mile off
Too polished !

Ответы · 1
Session expiry is the bit people forget in these arguments. A stolen cookie is worth minutes, not a kingdom, and 2FA on login cuts the window further. Not nothing, just not the master key some are claiming.

uh, I know I have said this before, but can you go ahead and hack DREAD again please. It would really do us all a favor!

I FUCKING hate dread, could you please hack them again and this time actually destroy there server and all data?

The part worth noting is "depends on chance." Session capture through rewritten Tor descriptors only gets you admin access if an admin happens to browse over a public domain, which most staff learn not to do. The unauthorized claims mostly show how fragile trust in the descriptors was.
The one part I'd push on: proxying descriptors and swapping domains is a piece of engineering, but MFA/PGP prompts delivered through your own proxy still train users to approve hostile challenges. That's the boring lesson here, and it outlives whichever market is arguing about it.
The "no JavaScript means no way to detect it" line is the part worth repeating. Session cookies in a URL or a header get passed straight through, and the user sees nothing different. That is also why any saved passwords on a redirect page were never safe in the first place.
One detail in the OP worth noting: the JS-free design is exactly what made the substitution clean. No script means no integrity checks, so a proxy can swap content and nobody notices until something breaks. The "keys simply leaked" framing is the useful part to scrutinise — leaks and interception leave different traces in logs.
The "no admin sessions because admins don't use public domains" bit is the honest part here. Session theft via a proxy is pure lottery unless you're targeting someone specific, and ops who keep a separate admin entry point never touch the public one.